Managing knowledge in policy networks. Organising joint fact-finding in the Scheldt Estuary. by Buuren, M.W. (Arwin) van et al.
  1
 
Managing knowledge in policy networks 
Organising joint fact-finding in the Scheldt Estuary  
 
Arwin van Buuren, Jurian Edelenbos & Erik-Hans Klijn 
 
Paper to be presented at the International Conference on Democratic Network 
Governance, Copenhagen, October 21st and 22nd 2004.  
 
 
Author information 
 
M.W. van Buuren is PhD student at the Center for Public Management, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, The Netherlands (email address: vanbuuren@fsw.eur.nl). 
 
Dr. J. Edelenbos is assistant professor at the Center for Public Management, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, The Netherlands (email address: edelenbos@fsw.eur.nl).  
 
Dr. E.H. Klijn is associate professor at the Center for Public Management, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, The Netherlands (email address: klijn@fsw.eur.nl). 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this paper we analyse the role of knowledge management in the policy process 
about the Development Plan 2010 for the Scheldt Estuary (a Dutch-Flemish river 
basin). The conflicts of interests around this package of measures are sharp. 
Therefore, knowledge is often strategically used in order to defend stakeholders’ own 
preferences. The project organisation (ProSes) that prepares the Development Plan 
organised a joint fact-finding process in order to reach ‘shared knowledge’. In this 
paper we evaluate this process. Especially the relations between the joint fact-finding 
process and the traditional democratic decision-making process and the separate 
organisations, which form part of the policy network, seem to be problematic. We 
formulate some conclusions about the possibilities and limitations of knowledge 
management within complex policy processes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In complex policy networks stakeholders often use knowledge as ammunition to 
convince one another of their own point of view. The ultimate policy option, a 
compromise of political and societal interests, has often a weak knowledge base. 
Decisions are based on assumptions and (political) intentions. Therefore, knowledge 
management of these policy processes in a network setting deserves our attention. In 
this paper we explore the role of knowledge and knowledge management in the 
functioning of policy networks. The structure of this paper is somewhat 
unconventional. We start with an empirical description of a complex policy process 
around the management of the Scheldt Estuary (in the Netherlands) in which 
knowledge plays an important but little fruitful role. Then we explore the theoretical 
background of knowledge battles within policy processes (section 3). Next we give an 
illustration of an attempt to reach ‘shared knowledge’ about the further deepening of 
the fairway to Antwerp (section 4). In addition we explore the role of knowledge 
management within policy processes. To make things more complex we then look at 
the difficult transfer of the results of joint fact-finding to the traditional political and 
administrative decision processes. Finally we explore the possibilities of democratic 
and political anchorage of shared knowledge. We conclude with some remarks on the 
possibilities and limitations of knowledge management in policy networks.  
 
2. Deepening a fairway, a balancing act 
 
Managing a river basin isn’t simple. This statement could be seen as a euphemism 
when we look at the dynamics and complexity of the Scheldt Estuary and the rather 
complicated way in which the Dutch and Flemish government arrange their policy 
decisions. For the most important part the Western Scheldt is Dutch, but the most 
important function of the Scheldt is being the fairway to the Flemish Port of Antwerp.  
 
Negotiations about deepening the fairway 
The Scheldt has many conflicting functions. The economic interests of the Port of 
Antwerp and of the Flemish region are big. The port activities of Antwerpen 
determine one quarter of the Flemish economy. It’s not strange, therefore, that the 
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Port of Antwerp regularly asks for further deepening of the fairway in which a few 
big thresholds hinder the access of big container ships.  
But the Scheldt Estuary is also one of the most important ecological areas of Western 
Europe. Deepening of the fairway is an artificial operation through which the estuary 
can be damaged. The estuary consists of a multiple trench system. The ecological 
value of the system results to a large degree from this unique morphological system. 
Inter tidal areas with unique habitats can only exist when there is a more or less 
stabile multiple trench system. An unnatural deepening of one of the trenches can 
mean the unchangeable degradation of the estuary.  
The Dutch government and environmental organisations were always careful to agree 
on the Flemish requests for further deepening. In the Netherlands it was in general 
believed that the dredging activities has seriously damaged the system and that further 
operations have to be avoided as much as possible. An important research report, 
written by a team of experts of the public research institute RIKZ (Governmental 
Institute of Coastal and Sea Research) and the direct responsible policy actor, 
Rijkswaterstaat (part of the Dutch Ministry of Transport), delivers a serious account 
of a deteriorating estuary (Vroon et.al. 1993). The Flemish parties looks with 
suspicion towards the closed ‘policy-research community’ in the Netherlands. They 
suspect that the Dutch anxiety to allow operations in the estuary was primarily 
motivated by the desire to protect the Port of Rotterdam for unwanted competition. 
Negotiation processes between Dutch and Flemish policy actors were always long, 
complicated and heavily politicised (Meijerink, 1998).  
In the early eighties the Port of Antwerp request a further deepening of the fairway. 
Only in 1997, the necessary dredging works started. This difficult policy trajectory 
doesn’t help the bilateral relations. In 1999 the two governments decide to intensify 
their co-operation in order to develop better relations. After a new request of the Port 
of Antwerp for a further deepening, both governments start an intensive deliberation 
process in order to reach a joint vision on the future of the estuary.  
 
Managing information processes 
In addition to the negotiations on the policy agreements, a substantial research process 
was organised, with a big emphasis on morphological research. Delft Hydraulics did 
this research, in close co-operation with RIKZ and Rijkswaterstaat. Delft Hydraulics 
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used a very formal, mathematical, model-based approach in order to predict future 
morphological developments.  
The most important protagonist of a further deepening, the Port of Antwerp, 
mobilised its own expertise. The Port of Antwerp Expert Team (PAET) was installed 
and they started a research project to explore the possibilities of morphological 
management: a way of dredging that stimulates positive ecological developments in 
the estuary. The Dutch parties followed this initiative with suspicion. In fact, a 
‘knowledge battle’ about the relation between human operations and undesirable 
ecological developments occurred. The Flemish actors took the stand that the Dutch 
negative developments within the estuary linked too easily to human operations 
instead of natural developments.  
The Flemish experts concentrated much of their criticism about the (mainly by Dutch 
institutes executed) morphological research on the use of ‘Cell concept’. Delft 
Hydraulics had developed this concept in order to model the estuary into seven 
comparable units. PAET sees this concept as an inadmissible simplification of reality, 
which could easily give rise to false and negative predictions. Flemish researchers and 
policy-makers do have much less confidence in mathematical models in comparison 
with their Dutch colleagues. They believed much more in an empirical approach, in 
which trail-and-error can take place. In line with this view they presented a report in 
which they outlined a much more historical and empirical view on the estuary and 
advocated a more pragmatic way of managing it.  
In 2001, both governments and the involved actors agreed upon five policy goals that 
constitute the Long Term Vision (LTV) on the Scheldt Estuary: 
- More and better bilateral co-operation; 
- The safeguarding of the accessibility of the Port of Antwerp (concrete: further 
research and policy negotiations are necessary in order to explore the possibilities 
of a further deepening of the fairway); 
- The safeguarding of the physical characteristics and the ecological values of the 
estuary; 
- The improvement of the external safety of the Western Scheldt. 
The Flemish Parliament agreed upon this Vision but asked for further research about 
the ideas of PAET in addition to the mathematical approach that has dominated the 
LTV trajectory. Many controversies, not only about necessary policy measures, but 
also about the facts and their interpretation were devised to ProSes (‘Project 
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Organisation Development Plan Scheldt Estuary’ a bilateral project organisation 
which had to implement the short term ambitions of the Long Term Vision. Within 
two years (2002-2004) ProSes has to deliver a concrete, integral package of measures 
(a so-called Development Plan) with which the policy goals of the Long Term Vision 
could be brought nearer. Support from all relevant stakeholders forms an important 
objective for ProSes.  
 
3. Problems of knowledge: frames and interpretation conflicts 
 
As became clear in the previous case study, managing knowledge for policy processes 
is far from unproblematic. Confronting different sources of knowledge, creating a 
joint base for knowledge and knowledge as basis for action are all difficult things to 
achieve. The reasons behind this is that problems that are tackled are often wicked 
problems while at the same time involved actors, necessary to solve these wicked 
problems, have different frames and thus different views on the problem and 
interpretations of information. If these aspects are not taken into account the search 
for more knowledge often leads to more conflict and actors looking for their own 
information instead of shared knowledge and subsequent actions which often is 
envisaged in more classical theories of decision making. 
 
Wicked problems and cognitive uncertainty 
The case that was presented in the introduction is a typical case of a wicked problem. 
Although there are many definitions of wicked problems (Radford, 1977; 
Mason/Mitroff, 1981), essentially wicked problems are characterised by 
(Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004): 
- the involvement of many actors; because wicked problems need the mobilisation 
of many resources often various actors are involved mostly not restricted to public 
actors alone but also the involvement of private and semi-private actors are 
needed; 
- disagreement about the nature of the problem and the desired solutions; in wicked 
problems often a clash of values is at stake. This and the fact that various actors 
are involved cause disagreement about what really the nature of the problem is or 
what the desirable solutions are. This problem cannot simply be solved by 
collecting more information as we will see later on; 
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- complexity of decision making; wicked problems are characterised by complex 
decision making not only because many actors are involved but also because 
mostly different networks and institutional structures are involved. Wicked 
problems require decisions from various arenas and governmental levels, often 
ask for integral solutions and policy measures which involve different (sector) 
networks and sometimes require the building of new organisational arrangements. 
This makes the decision making of wicked problems complex and standard 
operation procedures and organisational arrangements less suitable to tackle them 
(Marin/Mayntz, 1991). 
 
The characteristics of wicked problems mean that actors are struggling about two 
things at the same time when it comes to improving knowledge and problem solving 
capacity. On the one hand actors have their own perceptions of the problem and 
especially about the values that are at stake. The Port of Antwerp provides a clear 
example. Their view upon the estuary is fundamentally different from the perception 
of the administrator of the estuary, Rijkswaterstaat. In the perception of the Port of 
Antwerp, the most important function of the estuary is to be the fairway to Antwerp. 
Accessibility is the most important policy ambition. For Rijkwaterstaat the ecological 
and morphological health of the system are crucial conditions for the management of 
the system. Human activities are only allowed when they are compatible with the 
long-term sustainability of the system.  
This is certainly a struggle in which information is only one of the many things that 
are relevant. On the other hand actors are collecting information but this process is 
directed also by their perceptions and value judgements. So besides the simple fact 
that information may not be available or may be to difficult to collect (or to late to be 
relevant!) we also see that the information collecting process itself is directed by 
different frames (and thus different axioms) of the various actors. This frequently 
leads to a situation where each of the actors is collecting its own information based on 
different assumptions using different parameters. The result is a myriad of reports and 
streams of information at best but often a ‘war of reports’ in which actors continue 
their normative policy debate with partisan collected information (In ‘t Veld, 2000; 
Bueren/Klijn/Koppenjan, 2003; Van Buuren & Edelenbos, 2004). From a democratic 
point of view this collection of information and struggle through the collection of 
information does not have to be viewed as negative per se (Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). 
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Monopoly of knowledge is prevented and existing taken for granted information is 
challenged by other information which can enhance the discussion and the democratic 
decision making process. We will return to this issue further on. The discussion 
however mostly is not about dialogue and ‘truth finding’ but more about winning. 
Information is used to back existing positions and interests rather than engage in 
information exchange. The result of this process is in these situations often more 
confusion and uncertainty instead of a robust knowledge base for policy decisions. 
 
Actors, frames and knowledge 
Frames of actor cause different interpretations of information and different search 
strategies for information. By frames we mean more or less stable sets of perceptions 
actors have of the world (Fischer/Forester, 1993; Schön/Rein, 1994; Rein/Schön, 
1992; Sabatier, 1988; 1993; Van Eeten, 1999). These perceptions, that are images and 
interpretations, may concern aspects as the nature of problems, the desirable solutions 
but also judgements about other actors. They guide actors’ strategies and their 
interpretations of actions of other actors and available information.  
Frames are actor bound and are created through socialisation and experience but 
frames are also influenced by the institutional characteristics of networks where actors 
find themselves in. So one can often see that typical rules in networks about products, 
identities or reward rules (what is good or not) are being reflected in actors’ frames 
and by such in the choices they make. Differences in frames between actors are often 
responsible for cognitive blockages in decision-making processes. Because frames 
cause certain selection criteria of information and colour the search for information, 
differences of frames cause different interpretations of available knowledge and thus 
can be the source of knowledge conflicts and report battles.  
An example from the Scheldt Estuary is the question which factors explain the current 
state of the system. The environmental organisations and the administrations are 
inclined to accuse human activities in the estuary. The Port of Antwerp emphasise the 
importance of long-term developments in which each estuary lend to a less complex 
and dynamic form.  
Adding more information in the process to clarify the confusion will not help because 
actors will judge this new and extra information from their own frames and this new 
information will simply be extra material in the knowledge conflict. So we have a 
clear problematic situation here. The wicked character of the problem requires actors 
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to share knowledge and resources but if actors have different (maybe conflicting) 
frames agreement on what the available knowledge is and how to interpret that 
knowledge will be difficult to achieve. 
There is a difference between uncertainty and ambiguity of knowledge with respect to 
information gathering (Noordegraaf, 2000). Uncertainty of knowledge is caused by a 
lack of information. Reduction of uncertainty can be reached by searching more 
relevant information. Ambiguity of knowledge is caused by abundance of 
interpretations of available information. The solution is often found in integration of 
different interpretations and frame reflection. 
 
The need for shared knowledge, frame reflection and learning 
As has been said information sources are often spread among various actors. Finding 
satisfactory solutions for wicked problems described in the case needs bringing 
together information and resources. This is especially the case in the situation of 
wicked problems because there are often no standard routines and proven solutions on 
which actors can base their (joint) actions. In stead of a conflict situation where 
information is used as mean in the value struggle that is going on one would need a 
situation of a more or less shared body of knowledge on which actors can base their 
discussion about possible solutions. 
Finding such a sharing of information and creating a situation of shared knowledge is 
far from easy. It usually needs frame reflection in which actors reconsider their frames 
(Rein/Schön, 1992; Schön/Rein, 1994). Therefore learning processes are needed in 
which actors review their strategies and interpretations and incorporate new additional 
information in their frames. A very important aspect of this frame reflection process is 
the organisation of the research that is done to explore the problem at hand. If 
research has to contribute to problem solving in a situation of multi-actor dependence, 
a certain minimum of shared starting points and agreements has to be made among 
involved actors how research is going to be organised, what the main starting 
assumptions are and what the research has to achieve. Only in this situation research 
can contribute to frame reflection and learning and to new solutions for wicked 
problems that have to be tackled. 
We will look at the case again for an example of this building of a situation of shared 
knowledge that can form the basis for further action and problem solving. 
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4. Towards shared knowledge: ProSes as process architect 
 
The long history of conflict and frustrated policy processes was an important reason 
for the new initiated project organisation ProSes to think about a deliberate process 
strategy in which consensus and co-operation could be established. Therefore, 
balanced process architecture for the research was developed. We name this process 
of knowledge search ‘joint fact-finding’. In this process separate coalitions of 
scientists and policy-makers and other stakeholders with differing viewpoints and 
interests worked together in order to develop data and information, analyse facts and 
forecasts, develop common assumptions and informed opinions, and, finally, use the 
information they have developed to reach decisions together (McCreary et.al. 2000; 
Van Buuren & Edelenbos, 2004). In the case of the Scheldt Estuary co-operation with 
the most important public, private and societal actors, the formulation of the problem 
was determined. On the base of this document the necessary research projects were 
putted out to tender. When the research projects (on morphology, ecology, as well as 
on economic aspects) got started, they were accompanied by careful selected groups 
of experts. In these groups Dutch and Flemish public, private and societal actors 
participated. 
 
Working towards a joint frame 
In order to illustrate the way in which ProSes tried to reach consensus about ‘the 
facts’ we analyse the functioning of the Study Group Morphology, a selected group of 
experts that has to safeguard the quality and the acceptability of the research. They 
discussed the concrete design of the studies. They commented on draft reports. The 
Study Group accommodated some important discussions. A number of actors 
criticised the research about the morphological impact of the intended deepening. 
Some of them were Flemish (which continue the LTV discussion), other Dutch 
(which stress the quality of the research). In table 1 we summarise the most important 
criticism. 
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Actor Point of view Background / frame 
PAET Against one-sided model 
approach in research. 
Pleas for a more 
historical, qualitative and 
triangulate approach 
Epistemological: more practical, empirical, physical. Much 
attention for historical development and international 
comparison (natural processes in estuary over a long 
period of time) 
Pragmatic: alternative views upon dredging activities can 
lead towards policy decisions in favour of the Port of 
Antwerp 
RIKZ / 
RWS / 
Bureau 
Tidal 
Waters 
Against rashly research 
(with very strict time 
constraints) and using 
non-validated and non-
calibrated models 
Epistemological: empirical focus upon estuary. Much 
knowledge about recent changes in morphological 
characteristics. Less affinity with mathematical modelling.  
Pragmatic: cautious about possible impacts of further 
deepening of the fairway.  
Table 1. The main critics on the morphological research  
 
An important contribution to the discussion came from PAET. The experts from the 
Port of Antwerp developed their own vision upon the morphology of the Scheldt 
Estuary and wrote a report about the possibilities of ‘morphological management’ of 
the system. They believed that it was possible to influence unwanted developments 
within the system by smartly dredging and dumping. They proposed a proof dumping 
to build a sandbar with dredged material; in fact a totally new strategy was formed for 
gaining insight into the dynamics of the estuary. After a long period of hesitation and 
deliberation about the possible negative consequences, Rijkswaterstaat gave 
permission to start the proof.  
The Dutch experts questioned the use of models, which were insufficiently calibrated 
and validated, due to time and money constraints. In their opinion the quality of the 
research was sacrificed to the desire of the Flemish actors for a quick start of the 
deepening.  
After many discussions, Delft Hydraulics had to tone down the status of their research 
results. The project leader was urged to take into account the opinions of the Study 
Group and to formulated the conclusions in such a way that all members of the Study 
Group agreed upon them. In the end, the morphological reports showed some 
remarkable characteristics: 
1. there was much attention to the shortcomings of mathematical models; 
2. exact data were scarcely presented. Much more general trends were given; 
3. in the conclusions much attention was given to the ‘expert judgement’ of the 
members of the Study Group; 
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4. the conclusion was very moderate. The critical reader could read the conclusion 
as: a further deepening has presumably no negative consequences for the estuary, 
but in fact we don’t know.  
 
In the end we see more agreement among the participating actors about: 
- the relative value of using mathematical modeling; 
- the necessity of good empirical research (collecting data over long periods); 
- the moderate impact of human operations in the estuary in relation to long-term 
natural developments; 
- the potentials of an alternative approach (the ideas of PAET).  
We see that the road to a joint frame is a difficult journey in which all kinds of 
obstacles has to be taken. In the case of the Scheldt Estuary we don’t see this joint 
framework yet; actors find each other in a specific expression of the research results 
but the underlying frame controversies are not disappeared. However, the first 
contours of a shared knowledge base appear but the actors are not very willing to 
adjust their frames easily in the learning process of the joint fact-finding process, 
mainly because of the deep-rooted differences.  
 
Strengths of the process: more emphasis on variety   
When stakeholders participate in research processes, their commitment to the results 
is often larger then in a situation in which the research is a black box (Van Eeten & 
Ten Heuvelhof, 1999). After all, all experts support the main conclusions because 
they knew the way in which these conclusions were reached; the research process 
which leads to these specific results. Although some actors didn’t agree with the way 
in which these results were reached (through mathematical models) they could 
support the results because they knew the merits of the research that correspond with 
their expert opinion.  
The main conclusions of the morphological research mirror the differences of opinion 
of the members of the Study Group. The certainties of the model calculations were 
softened. The potentials of the alternative approach of PAET were mentioned. This 
emphasis on variety was certainly an important factor to bring parties closer together. 
The attempt to generate more variety in the research was also enhanced by including 
other judgements from experts. This was an attempt not only to validate research, but 
also to provide opinions from outside and thus to create more openness in the 
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information seeking process. One of them was the obliged judgement of the 
Commission on the Environmental Impact Assessment.  This Commission has reacted 
upon the ‘Announcement’, the document in which the research plans were described. 
Their judgement was critical, but in essence positive. This was an important argument 
for ProSes to convince stakeholders about the correctness of the research approach. 
The definitive judgement of the Commission (on the Environmental Impact 
Assessment) will be known in the autumn of 2004.  
As a reaction on the controversies between the different experts, ProSes called for a 
second opinion of the morphological research. An independent group of international 
recognised experts have adjudged the reports in order to win confidence in their 
validity by the different stakeholders. The judgement of this team of experts was 
critical but also positive. The letter in which they formulated their conclusions was 
distributed among the stakeholders. The conclusions of the Study Group Morphology 
were also disseminated towards the stakeholders.   
 
Organising research and organisational connections 
If we look at the information process that ProSes set up to reach more consensus 
about the available research and information we can see some interesting features who 
provide some telling things about organising research activities and organisational 
connections. 
An important failure of ProSes was their a priori choice for Delft Hydraulics as 
contracting partner for the morphological research. This choice was not 
communicated with the stakeholders. Much criticism was directed towards the one-
sided mathematical approach of Delft Hydraulics. It is not improbable that a more 
deliberate choice for a research consortium (composed of both Flemish and Dutch 
institutes) could have prevented this discomfort.  
In the very beginning of the research process, ProSes formulated the research 
questions that formed the basis for the activities of the research institutes. The 
Working Groups began to function after the start of the research process. They were 
not involved in the formulation of the research questions. Much criticism was devoted 
to this way of doing. Many wishes of the Working Group couldn’t be satisfied 
because of the formulated research questions.  
Both the research process and the policy process had their own dynamics. The policy 
process started with formulating the problem definition as a starting point for the 
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research process and the policy negotiations. At the same time most research projects 
were started up and the research questions were formulated on the base of the problem 
definition. The advantage of this way of organising both processes lied in the 
possibility of making connections: new research questions that were raised during the 
deliberations could be picked up by the researchers and new insights from the 
research projects could be brought in the policy discussions. However, in the end this 
way of operating didn’t result in the advantages people expected. Most research 
results became known at the end of the research process. Global results were 
announced in the meantime, but they lacked the necessary specificity. When the final 
reports were finished, four concept versions of the definitive policy plan were already 
discussed and some important decisions were taken (subject to eventual 
‘disappointing’ research results). On the other hand, supplementary research questions 
(from for example the agricultural stakeholders) couldn’t be taken into account, 
because of the limited available time and money. This underlines the need for good 
time keeping and careful connection of the research process to the general decision-
making process.  
Not only the temporal linking of the research and policy processes is important. The 
couplings regarding the content are also very important. Joint fact-finding can only be 
successful when decision makers use the information on which the stakeholders in the 
research arena agree.   
Many controversies were passed on to two other arenas: the Long Term Research and 
Monitoring Program (an initiative raised by the Long Term Vision) and the successor 
of ProSes, the organisation that has to implement the package of measures. Although 
most of the involved actors were satisfied with this strategy it in fact it means 
‘postponing possible conflicts to the future’. Certainly if no process arrangements are 
made to solve these conflicts this can cause blockages further on in the decision 
making process  
In order to reach consensus about the research results, Delft Hydraulics had to 
emphasise the uncertainties of their data. On several spots in the final report the 
limitations of the models were explained and the uncertainties of the results indicated. 
But the adverse effect of this strategy was that some critical policy actors (especially 
the Province of Zeeland) don’t want to base policy decisions upon such soft data. This 
again raises the important question of the connection of the research process to the 
general decision making process. 
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Conclusion: organising the research process 
In the above section we have described the organization of joint fact-finding around 
the Scheldt Estuary. In the next paragraph we will elaborate upon the theory of joint 
fact-finding in complex policy process. On the basis of our case study we present 
some general insights into the way shared knowledge in policy processes can be 
reached.  
 
5. Knowledge management for policy processes 
 
Reaching a sufficient level of policy-relevant information and consensus about these 
facts is a difficult job. Within our case, we can see several attempts for knowledge 
management within policy processes in complex network settings. In this paragraph 
we elaborate somewhat further upon these points.  
We already have stressed that actors have different frames and therefore different 
value systems, preferences, problem definitions and opinions about information. 
Reaching shared knowledge and processes of mutual learning through joint actions 
(Schön/Rein, 1994). This can be stimulated by several knowledge management 
strategies. If we look at the large amount of literature on knowledge management we 
can see four very important themes that especially concern knowledge generating and 
mutual learning in complex decision processes (Lindblom/Cohen, 1979; Jasanoff, 
1990; Schön/Rein, 1994; De Bruijn et al, 1998; Ehrmann & Stinson, 1999; In’t Veld 
& Verhey, 2000; Edelenbos et al, 2003):  
1) safeguarding the quality of the research (Funtowicz et.al. 2000; Van de Riet, 
2003) 
i) perceived independence, credibility and authoritativeness 
ii) between negotiated nonsense and superfluous knowledge 
2) creating robust social contexts with intensive interactions between experts and 
stakeholders (Patton, 1987; Caswill & Shove, 2002) 
3) boundary work: safeguarding the boundaries between science and policy 
(Jasanoff, 1990; Van Eeten & Ten Heuvelhof, 1998; Gieryn, 2002) 
4) timely and accurate connections between research process and policy negotiations 
(De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1999; Wiltshire, 2001). 
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Safeguarding the quality of the research  
Frame reflection is stimulated when the research results are perceived as independent 
and authoritative. Joint fact-finding is a method for organising research processes, in 
which the different opinions about the policy problem are taken into account 
(Busenberg, 1999; McCreary et. al. 2001; Leach et. al. 2002; Nowotny, 2003). 
Research information can only be perceived as independent and authoritative when 
the different actors with diverging frames recognize their point of view in the research 
reports.  
The involvement of actors in a research process means (Ehrmann & Stinson, 1999; 
Edelenbos et al, 2003; Van Buuren & Edelenbos, 2004): 
- the joint development of the research questions in order to take into account the 
problem definitions of the stakeholders; 
- the collaborative choice of research methods and techniques in order to reckon 
with different epistemological value systems; 
- consensus about the used theory or causal model in order to take the different 
opinions about the policy problem, its causes and consequences, serious; 
- the joint interpretation of the results and the collaborative formulation of the 
conclusions in order to reach a shared understanding of the facts which will be 
used in the policy negotiations. 
When we reflect upon our case, we see that ProSes have invested most energy in the 
last phase: the joint interpretation of the results. The choice for Delft Hydraulics was 
made before the Working Group was started. The choice for this institute roughly 
implies also the choice for a mathematical and less historical-empirical approach of 
the morphologic research. The underlying theory (with the Cell Concept etc.) was also 
determined by the choice for Delft Hydraulics. Only when the report was written, 
stakeholders were given a voice in softening the conclusions. 
One of the most important problems of joint fact-finding processes can be formulated 
as balancing between negotiated nonsense and superfluous knowledge (Van de Riet, 
2003; Van Eeten, 1999; Van Eeten & Ten Heuvelhof, 1998). Negotiated nonsense 
means that knowledge has support of the stakeholders but at the same time lack sound 
scientific ground. Superfluous knowledge means knowledge that is scientifically 
correct, but don’t take into account the problem definitions and values of (some) 
stakeholders.  
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In the case of ProSes we see both problems. An example of negotiated nonsense can 
be found in the input of the experts of PAET. They propose an alternative dredging 
strategy. The evidence for the fruitfulness of this strategy is limited. But the 
possibilities of this idea, the eventual simultaneous improvements of the safety, the 
accessibility and the ecology of the estuary, were too beautiful that actors don’t want 
to emphasise the relative small scientific base of it. 
Superfluous knowledge also exists in the ProSes case. We see that Delft Hydraulics 
holds on the Cell Concept while different actors don’t believe in the validity of it. The 
research report reflects this controversy: the concept is used, but its added value is 
toned down.  
 
Creating robust social contexts 
Involving stakeholders in the research process is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for reaching frame reflection. A robust social context in which these 
stakeholders interact with each other is necessary in order to stimulate mutual 
learning. Within a rich social context, in which a sufficient level of trust and openness 
consists, reaching shared knowledge is much easier than in a context in which distrust 
and closeness is dominant.  
If we define trust as a more or less stable perception of actors about other actors, that 
is that they refrain from opportunistic behaviour, this has several advantages for 
knowledge generation processes (see large literature on trust, Zand, 1972; Ring/Van 
de Ven, 1992; Parker/Vaidya, 2001; Nooteboom, 2002; Edelenbos/Klijn, 2003): 
- the more actors trust each other the more they will be prepared to share 
information because they expect others to be prudent and careful with that 
information; 
- the more actors trust each other the more they will invest in co-operation because 
they can handle conflicts with more ease; 
- the more actors trust each other the more they will be incline to cooperate to 
create innovation and new products and policy outcomes because trust reduces the 
uncertainty connected to strategic actions of other actors. 
So in general trust is expected to create more stable processes with more flow of 
information between the actors and more risk-taking in term of innovations and new 
solutions to be pursued. But trust is not always easy to establish. Building trust 
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requires intensive and enduring interactions and therefore time. A sense of mutual 
dependency is necessary to stimulate actors to co-operate.  
In ProSes, we see how distrust a long time dominated the Working Group 
Morphology. Deep-rooted negative perceptions of each other prevent the Working 
Group to become a ‘rich social context’. Too little was invested in close interactions 
between the main antagonists. Younger people did not replace people with a long 
history. The Working Group is at least partly dominated and influenced by the clashes 
and cleavages that occurred in the long history of research around the Scheldt Estuary. 
The preliminary choice for Delft Hydraulics was one of the most important mistakes 
of ProSes.  
 
Boundary work: safeguarding the boundaries of science and policy 
Involving stakeholders in the policy process doesn’t mean that the research process 
can be used to realise policy ambitions. There have to be some degree of scientific 
‘neutrality’ but the research results don’t deliver the objective truth. A process of 
negotiation and valuing is necessary to reach policy decisions. Research results are 
‘only’ information within a policy debate.  
Scientists often have ‘technocratic’ ambitions (Fischer, 1990). They want to structure 
the policy debate with a scientific, rational logic. Scientists have often a very cynical 
view of the policy world. In the case of ProSes we see how experts try to structure the 
policy debate when they propose to use a multi-criteria analysis for weighing policy 
options against each other. The project organisation ProSes doesn’t agree with this 
proposal. The policy deliberations have to be divided from the scientific process: 
value conflicts cannot be scientifically resolved. 
Sometimes, the boundary between science and politics becomes too thick. The 
Working Group Morphology stresses the uncertainties surrounding the morphological 
research. From a scientific view, this was a correct strategy. But from a political point 
of view, it makes much of the research useless for taking policy decisions.  
Boundary work between science and policy is needed (Jasanoff, 1990). This means 
that the connection between the research process and the political process has to be 
thought-out carefully. Too tight connection between science and policy might result in 
partisan science. At the other hand too loose connection might lead to research 
outcomes with no impact in decision-making. Joint fact-finding has to balance on the 
edge of this dilemma. 
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Timely connections between research process and policy negotiations 
Too often, temporal misfits hinder the use of research results in the policy process. 
Ideally, researchers deliver their insights when policy-makers deliberate on that 
specific issue. There are, however, many problems with organising these two 
processes parallel to each other. The research process often asks much time in order to 
generate some degree of clarity and of certainty. Policy-makers have tight deadlines 
and want to have the research results in time.  
 
After all, notwithstanding the imperfections of the joint fact-finding process, to a 
certain degree ProSes succeed in reaching consensus between the main stakeholders. 
But, there remains one important problem. That concerns the relation between the 
interactive negotiation process around the estuary and the formal (political, 
democratic) decision arenas in The Hague and Brussels. On this (often neglected) 
success factor of joint fact-finding, we will elaborate in the next two paragraphs.  
 
6. ProSes and the danger of insufficient engagement 
 
Joint fact-finding can be seen as a temporary and less formalized network of 
stakeholders in search for meaningful information. ProSes is a project organisation 
that tries to organize and facilitate that joint fact-finding process. The policy and 
research process that they have organised, serves one important goal: the realisation 
of an integral and balanced Development Plan that can be approved by the 
government and the representatives of both countries. Therefore, support from the 
stakeholders and the organisations involved in the management of the estuary, is 
necessary. During the process much is invested in gaining this support.  
ProSes can realise, within the context of a short-term, intensive policy process, a 
balanced package of policy measures with enough support of the involved actors and 
supported by convincing arguments, shared by the main stakeholders. However, a 
couple of difficulties remain. 
The first is the gearing to one another of the representatives of organisations as the 
environmental organisations, the province of Zeeland and the Port of Antwerp and 
their grassroots. Within the relative ‘private’ setting of ProSes, actors reach a degree 
of consensus. But it is not said that their home organisations are satisfied by the 
results of the policy process. For example, one representative of the environmental 
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organisation has participated in the Working Group Morphology and has agreed on 
the main conclusions of the morphological research. However, the environmental 
organisations are very dissatisfied with the proposed environmental policy proposals. 
That forms a reason to attack the morphological research for the great uncertainties 
that surrounds the conclusions and thus the policy proposal for deepening the fairway. 
There is also a substantial difficulty with the relation between ProSes and the 
interactive dialogue process that this organisation has organised on the one hand and 
the ministers, the governments and the Parliaments of both countries who have to 
approve the Development Plan. Some of the departments (the Dutch ministries of 
Agriculture and of Transport) are not pleased with the proposed environmental 
measures, mainly because of financial reasons. They look at the research results and 
conclude that the effects of a deepening don’t have significant effects upon the 
ecological condition of the estuary. Therefore: in their opinion additional 
environmental investments are not necessary. This conclusion is (scientifically) 
correct. The actors involved in the ProSes negotiations, on the contrary, agree on the 
necessity to restore some habitats because of the relative deplorable condition of the 
estuary. Their consensus about a further deepening of the fairway depends partially on 
the support for extra investments in nature and environment.  
Thus, the agreement that actors reach about scientific results and policy ambitions 
within the context of a temporary negotiation process, has to be passed on to the 
formal political and democratic procedures in order to sustain the consensus between 
the stakeholders.  Until now, nothing is known about the support of both parliaments 
for the Development Plan. It is not unthinkable that the Dutch Parliament will have 
some objections. Somewhat exaggerated: an agreement produced in a careful process 
of nearly two years can be outvoted within half an hour. 
 
7. The democratic and organisational anchorage of joint fact-finding 
 
Out of the less formalized, bottom-up processes new ‘governance networks’ emerge, 
which are based on interdependencies between public, private and civil society actors. 
These networks often exist quite a long time. As a result they develop their own rules 
of conduct, routines and procedures (Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). New institutions 
develop, which can be characterized as ‘proto-institutions’ (Lawrence et al, 2002). 
Although many definitions and descriptions of institutions stress their long-term and 
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stable character, we expressly want to add this with the possibility of short-term 
institutions in order to stress the dynamic character of institutions and possible clashes 
between different institutional regimes. In this way de-institutionalization - instead of 
institutionalization - comes in play. In our view, for instance a temporary joint fact-
finding process can already often imposes a temporary institutional structure on top of or 
next to existing organizational and political institutions, which have implications for 
existing institutions.  
 
Disconnected and loosely coupled 
Temporary networks that arise from joint fact-finding initiatives are often remote 
from traditional approaches to representative control and accountability. The new 
institutions arising from bottom-up processes offer potentials – i.e. efficiency of the 
process, legitimacy of the process  – but at the same time bring problems along as 
they are often disconnected or very loosely coupled to formal democratic and/or 
organizational structures.  
Several studies (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2004; Edelenbos, 2005; Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000; Sorenson & Torfing, 2003; Skelcher, forthcoming) make clear that there are 
problems with linking networks with (classical) representative forms of governance.  
 
A first observation is that there is often a 'missing institutional link' between networks 
and formal decision-making (Edelenbos, forthcoming). Joint fact-finding processes are 
often organized as an informal process with different rules and roles than the existing 
institutional representative system, which runs parallel or prior to the formal 
institutions of negotiation and decision-making. As such, informal, interactive, 
bottom-up processes can be seen as an extra phase or stage before the real decision-
making process begins. The formal processes often do not adapt themselves to the 
informal games of joint fact-finding, and vice versa.  
This poor institutional embeddedness of joint fact-finding networks often leads to 
'cherry-picking' behavior on the part of decision-makers, because they do not feel 
committed to the variety created by the informal joint fact-finding process. As a 
result, the rich variation 'evaporates' as soon as the joint fact-finding process has 
ended and formal policy-making has begun. Joint fact-finding is well equipped to 
generate a wide range of ideas, plans and suggestions, but is often ill equipped to 
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retent this variety out of interactive processes and use it for subsequent – often formal 
– (policy) processes. 
A second observation is that during the first stages of the joint fact-finding process 
existing institutions leave more room for new institutions than during the final stage 
(decision-making). At the end of the process, when decisions have to be prepared and 
finally made, the existing institutions are rehabilitated and the temporary institutions 
of the joint fact-finding process neglected. In the earlier stages those in the joint fact-
finding network were allowed to play, with a limited and reticent involvement of the 
parties prominent in the representative system. In contrast, after the joint fact-finding 
output went into the existing institutional structure of the representative system, with 
only a limited attendance and voice of the participants.  
 
Tensions between the boundary and the home practice 
A third observation is that joint fact-finding often misses organizational links to their 
‘home practices’ which participants in the network represent. Participants have got 
authority of their home organization the act on their behalf. Sometimes, we see in 
practice that participants have problems of getting achievement in the joint fact-
finding network back to their home organizations. In practice mandates are often not 
so solid as they first seem. Moreover, people of the home organizations sometimes 
feel that their representatives have gone adrift. We see a tension between the home 
front in which certain interests, values and opinions are made absolute and the 
representatives, which have gone through a dialogue and negotiation process with 
other stakeholders in which values and interests are put into perspective. 
Representatives think that they have realized a fine agreement with others, while 
people at the home organizations are stuck with the feeling that they have been sold 
out. This tension oftentimes means that successes in the joint fact-finding networks 
are at the same time seen as failures in the home organizations. In other words the 
organizational linkage to the home organizations is very thin and breaks as soon as the 
home organizations aren’t satisfied with the accomplishments of their representatives.  
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8. Conclusion: possibilities and limitations of knowledge management  
 
The challenges for knowledge management in complex policy processes 
We have argued in our paper that knowledge creation is far from easy in complex 
networks. Knowledge and information isn’t value-free. Interests, perspectives, values 
and norms determine for a great deal what we see as relevant information and colour 
the information that is provided us. Knowledge is uncertain and ambiguous by nature.  
A second problem is that that knowledge creation is not only an individual process but 
also a collective process. When stakeholders connect their own meaning to 
information it often leads to convincing strategies in which stakeholders try to inflict 
their truth on others. Knowledge is often used as ammunition in trying to reach own 
goals and interests. In this way knowledge doesn’t facilitate but rather frustrates the 
policy-making process. We have to find common ground in order to reach knowledge, 
which is meaningful for a group of stakeholders. A joint fact-finding process is a way 
of realizing collective meaningful information. Frame reflection and shared 
knowledge are crucial conditions for building consensus in a policy process. Research 
institutes are not neutral fact finders, but their work have to be accomplished by the 
critical involvement of stakeholders, in order to prevent report wars and cognitive 
blockades. 
Managing joint fact-finding processes is – as we have seen – not unproblematic. In 
order to reach their own goals, actors choose strategically between the arenas and 
processes in which they participate (Weggeman & Van Buuren, 2004). Only when 
they are convinced of their mutual dependence, they will engage themselves to a 
process of collaborative dialogue.  
Reaching shared knowledge and frame reflection among actors with very different 
worldviews is not easy. Nobody can (and shall!) enforce another actor to change his 
mind. In the end, knowledge management only can organise a fruitful context in 
which shared knowledge can be formed. In such a context mutual trust and respect, 
transparency and openness, and serious attention for a careful process of negotiation 
are crucial. Only when actors felt they are taken seriously, they are willing to co-
operate in a process of deliberation and finding joint solutions.  
However, there is an additional problem for joint fact-finding processes. A joint fact-
finding process is in practice a temporary informal network, which often lacks 
organizational and democratic anchorage. Representatives of organizations in the joint 
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fact-finding process have to maintain contact with their home organizations in order 
to get knowledge through in their home organization. Sometimes shared knowledge in 
the joint fact-finding process can’t count on support in the home organizations. The 
same applies for political decision-making. Members of Parliament are often at a 
distance of the joint fact-finding process, and are less committed to research 
outcomes. As a result, they have often no trouble of neglecting research, which 
doesn’t serve their goals and intentions. 
The above observations may partly be explained from a lack of attention on the part of 
knowledge managers for the institutional incorporation of the joint fact-finding process. 
Knowledge managers often show little sensitivity to and awareness of existing 
democratic and organizational institutions. This results in marginal attention for the 
institutional incorporation of joint fact-finding networks. Moreover, knowledge 
managers must also take the relation between the boundary practice (i.e. the temporary 
network) and the home practice (the organizations that participants represent) and the 
existing democratic decision-making processes into account in order to prevent 
evaporation of rich results of the joint fact-finding process. In order words: knowledge 
management implies at the same time democratic and organizational anchorage of 
shared knowledge. Joint fact-finding as a knowledge management strategy emphasise 
the importance of a good process architecture (Edelenbos et. al. 2003): of the research 
process itself, but also of the relation between research and policy processes.  
 
Democratic anchorage of shared knowledge: first draft of a research agenda 
Much of the literature about knowledge management is devoted to the pure rational 
approach of knowledge: through a process of acquisition, dissemination and utilization, 
knowledge serves as a basis for decision-making (Weggeman, 2000; McAdam & 
McCreery, 1999). Only recently there is more attention for the more democratic aspects 
of knowledge. In the literature this is reflected by studies on social learning and social 
capital, communities of practice etcetera (Huysman & De Wit, 2004; Achterbergh & 
Vriens, 2001). 
However, one of the key problems of the study of modern public management: the 
relation between (more or less informal) governance processes and the official 
political and democratic decision-making procedures directs our attention towards the 
problem of transferring knowledge from one context to another. This theme is 
partially discussed in the literature on inter-organizational learning and on the theme 
  24
of absorptive capacity (Bosch et.al. 1999; Plaskoff, 2003). To get more insight in the 
way a robust anchorage of joint fact-finding processes within the traditional hierarchy 
and representative democracy can be reached, it is necessary to ‘translate’ the mainly 
on the private sector oriented knowledge management literature for the public sector 
in combination with careful case-studies. In this paper some first building blocks are 
presented. Some preliminary conclusions from that can be drawn (see also 
Klijn/Koppenjan, 2000b): 
- Since connections between fact-finding processes and ‘traditional’ decision 
making processes are not made by it self these need process designs to connect 
them. This also means designing an explicit role for elected politicians in drafting 
and deciding upon such a process design; 
- Fact-finding processes are as have been made clear closely connected to value 
conflicts. The variety of collecting information and the process has to resemble 
the variety of interests and values by the involved stakeholders; 
- The possibilities and limitations of the fact-finding process have to be made clear 
as much as possible in the beginning. This can either be done by an explicit 
statement of elected politicians at the beginning of the limitations and constraints 
or by trying to develop some understanding in the beginning between the actors. 
 
It becomes also clear for the discussion and the case that organizing joint fact-finding 
in complex policy processes is difficult and requires a lot of managerial activity. A 
knowledge manager needs to organize carefully the process of information gathering, 
to reach shared knowledge and to secure the organizational and democratic link of 
that shared knowledge in order to produce meaningful knowledge in complex 
networks.  
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